PREFACE
In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy in different ways to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data,,,l that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear ever to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. In this book, I have tried to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy.
Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point.
Similarly, Wittgenstein's main attention throughout his entire philosophical career is directed to one's immediate experience. What makes Wittgenstein's phenomenology unusual, however, is the way he views immediate experience. For Wittgenstein, especially the early Wittgenstein, the nature of the immediately given is unique in the sense that the possibility of logic is also based on it. Indeed, the fact that Wittgenstein sees the foundation of logic in immediate experience is what makes his philosophy a kind of phenomenology. In the Tractatus, all logical forms are combinations of logical forms of immediately given objects of experience. Also, immediate experience can only be grasped and understood by means of language, because Wittgenstein views language as the ultimate medium through which we understand the world. Therefore, the important problem for him is the way we use language to describe immediate experience. In my study, I examine Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it, a concern which guides his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work.
Chapter one discusses the general problems with regard to Wittgenstein's phenomenology. I widely examine and discuss the philosophical background of Wittgenstein's phenomenology, which should be clearly distinguished from any form of phenomenalism. that eventually grows into the notion of grammar, and how he shifts language paradigms, namely from the phenomenological language of the Tractatus to the physicalistic language of ordinary use. In light of this shift, I examine his middle-period treatment of solipsism and the problem of phenomenology of time. The change in the language paradigms apparently makes it impossible for Wittgenstein to conduct phenomenological enterprise. In fact, the abandonment of earlier logic, which is phenomenological in nature, waters down the phenomenological aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the middle period on to the extent that he declares "there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems.,,2 I examine how Wittgenstein continues to wrestle with these phenomenological problems as he develops the language-game idea.
In chapter four I discuss Wittgenstein's treatment of color concepts. The problem of color is very phenomenological for Wittgenstein in the sense that the color he examines is color we immediately experience. I show that Wittgenstein tackles this phenomenological problem of color from the early period through the very last. In the early period colors are the example of Tractarian objects, so that from the beginning, Wittgenstein has no interest in the theory of physical color, a point well presented and supported in his Philosophical Remarks, where he repeatedly says of the theory of color that contains no hypothetical elements. As the language-game idea develops, Wittgenstein directs his concern toward how we can express and describe the color of immediate experience in our language-game, and so I conclude the color chapter with a discussion of the language-game of color.
In This statement reveals more or less what Wittgenstein means by his phenomenology, namely that he is concerned with the 'color' we immediately experience and with the mention of it in a hypothesis-free manner. Usually, talking of phenomenology instantly reminds one of HusserI and his unique philosophical method of phenomenological epoche, an essential doctrine of his phenomenology. Thus we might expect Wittgenstein also to have some sort of a methodological principle equivalent to the Husserlian epoche. It is clear that Wittgenstein's interest is directed to what is immediately given in one's experience, a point not much different from where Husserl's phenomenology starts. However, unlike Husserl, there is no mention of a methodological principle similar to epoche in Wittgenstein's phenomenology. Perhaps Wittgenstein had no need for a special method in his phenomenological enterprise. Wittgenstein's discussion of phenomenology usually coincides with the problems of phenomenological language, i.e., the way we describe immediate experience. Thus, in the case of his attempted phenomenological color theory above, Wittgenstein is concerned with 'the color we immediately experience' (the content of immediate experience) and 'the mention of it in a hypothesis-free manner' (the way in which we describe it). So we can say that Wittgenstein's phenomenological problem is the problem of immediate experience and the language that describes it. Whether he was familiar with HusserI's works or not, Wittgenstein did not seem to have a general interest in the transcendental aspects of phenomenology in the Husserlian sense. This can be further supported by Wittgenstein's attitude against the synthetic a priori nature ofHusserlian phenomenological statements. 7 There have been intermittent attempts to compare Wittgenstein's philosophy with Husserlian phenomenology or to relate it to the context of the phenomenological movement. But as I will discuss the early attempts later in chapter 6, they seem to fall short of grasping the full scope of Wittgenstein's phenomenology, partly because they fail to see the evident phenomenological feature immanent in the logical analysis of the Tractatus, and partly because they overlook phenomenological problems pervade many different stages of Wittgenstein's work. The facts that Wittgenstein' s references to 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological language' mostly appear in his middle-period writings, and that he declares the impossibility of phenomenological language should not lead one to think that his phenomenology is confined to a certain period of time in his philosophy. It is true that the Philosophical Remarks gives the impression that phenomenology is impossible because phenomenological language is impossible, as Wittgenstein states in the first section of the book. 8 What may be true is to say that Wittgenstein's use of the term 'phenomenology' or 'phenomenological language' ceases to appear after appearing frequently for a certain period of time. But that neither implies that his earlier philosophy was not phenomenological, nor that he turned away from what he believed to be the existing phenomenological problems. In no way for Wittgenstein does the rejection of phenomenological language also mean the rejection of phenomenological problems. For him, this rejection only means the replacement of phenomenological language by physicalistic language, a transition in language paradigms after he realizes the true nature of our language which belongs to the physical system. 9 That is why he could set a new goal after denying the possibility of phenomenological language in the first section of the Philosophical Remarks. It is to show what is essential to the class of languages which serve their purpose, and to an immediate representation of immediate experience.
Even though Wittgenstein no longer believes in phenomenological language, he indeed keeps addressing phenomenological problems by directing his attention to immediate experience and the task of hypothesis-free description of immediate experience. But as the pure description of immediate experience without phenomenological language is not possible, he opts to maintain that his phenomenology would be the grammar of the description. This point is not only presented in the first section of the Philosophical Remarks but is also supported by one of his middle-period slogans "Phenomenology is grammar," which appears in the Big Typescript.
However, that Wittgenstein's phenomenology is not a by-product of a short-lived whim is decisively shown in his very last writings. Whether he believes in phenomenological language or not, Wittgenstein has phenomenological problems in mind and keeps trying to cope with them up to the very last days of his life. In 1951 he asserted,
There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems. (RC, I, sec. 53; cf. III, sec. 248) What would possibly be the phenomenological problems in question? At this late date Wittgenstein tackles color concepts once again. In his middle period, he wanted to establish 'a phenomenological color theory where no hypothetical objects occur.' It was the idea of the same period when he rejected the possibility and necessity of phenomenological language. Almost 20 years later and on the verge of death, Wittgenstein tries to deal with this matter once again but without phenomenological language. This is nothing other than a mature presentation of what he set out to do after the rejection of phenomenological language in the first section of the Philosophical Remarks. In it, he states that he will do away with phenomenological language yet find a way to do the same job that phenomenological language would have done.
A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language. (PR, sec. 1) This statement clearly reveals the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology, which cannot be successfully discussed without connecting its problems to language. In a way he secures a place for addressing phenomenological problems within the physicalistic language system by attempting to figure out the essential grammar of our language. If he is successful, he really has no need to postulate such a thing as phenomenological language, in which he once believed.
There is a further justification enabling us to characterize Wittgenstein's phenomenology this way. It is his middle-period use of paired terms 'first system' and 'second system' , or 'primary language' and 'secondary language' with regard to the two language systems. According to Wittgenstein's use of these terms, it can be noted that by 'first system' or 'primary language' he means phenomenological language that describes immediate experience, whereas by 'second system' or 'secondary language' he means physicalistic language. 10 Primary language is a language that serves to describe phenomena as they appear without any hypotheses. It mainly describes what is immediate; it does no more than pure description. On the other hand, secondary language is one that we employ to explain and predict by using hypotheses and by establishing laws of physics. Its function is more than description. Needless to say, Wittgenstein's phenomenology is closely related to the first system or primary language. And that is one way that Wittgenstein characterizes his phenomenological problems. It is once again the problem of immediate experience and the language that describes it.
IfWittgenstein's phenomenology is undoubtedly related to what he calls phenomenological language, his distinction between phenomenological language and physicalistic language and his shift of language paradigms in favor of physicalistic language must be very important in understanding his phenomenology. Although I will discuss the shift of language paradigms in chapter 3, a brief look at his distinction between two languages will be helpful. One thing we should be careful about is what exactly Wittgenstein means by phenomenological language and physicalistic language.
If phenomenological language is a language that describes what is given in immediate experience, what is physicalistic language? Although Wittgenstein relates physicalistic language (or secondary language) to the system of physics, it does not mean that his physicalistic language is the language of physics. It may include the propositions of physics. 11 But his term 'physicalistic language' is not exclusively used to refer to them, for Wittgenstein sometimes means everyday ordinary language by his term 'physicalistic language' .12 Wittgenstein's physicalistic language is best understood when we compare it to his phenomenological language. Because phenomenological language describes what is directly given, the references of its basic symbols are immediate sense-data. As will be discussed later in chapter 2, sense-data are the most immediate data given in our experience. Since no hypothetical elements are added, we often describe them by 'this' or 'that'. On the other hand, physicalistic language is a language which adds hypothetical elements to the given data in representing them. Thus, the references of its basic symbols are physical objects, and we often use the words 'book' or 'table' to refer to those objects. In this sense, Wittgenstein's physicalistic language does not mean the same thing as the language of physics. 13 Another thing to examine before we advance is where possibly Wittgenstein obtained paired terms such as 'first system' and 'second system' or 'primary language' and 'secondary language' which mean phenomenological language and physicalistic language respectively. Interestingly, Rudolf Carnap was using the distinction of 'primary' and 'secondary' in his writings. In his 1928 book, popularly known as the Aufbau, Carnap regards what is given in our direct experience as 'primary' and what is an abstraction from the given as 'secondary' .14 In this period, Carnap's concern seems to be directed to what is epistemically primary in logical construction, and thus he emphasizes the given, which is characterized as direct experience itself But in a 1932 paper that appeared in Erkenntnis, Camap uses the term 'primary language (die erste Sprache)' as a more appropriate reference to his protocol-language. IS For Camap, the protocollanguage deals with the given. It is 'language of direct experience' or 'phenomenal language' which seems similar to Wittgenstein's primary language or phenomenological language. The simplest statements in Camap's protocol-language also refer to the given and describe directly-given experience. Although it is remarkable that Camap also used the term 'primary language' to describe the given, it is not clear in fact Camap's use of the term influenced Wittgenstein. 16 The idea of 'primary' and 'secondary' also appear in Frank Ramsey's writings. In his "Theories"(1929), Ramsey talks about the primary system in a way that instantly reminds us of some ideas from the Tractatus:
It [a notation of the primary system] might in the first case consist of names of different types any two or more of which conjoined together gave an atomic while the latter was a schoolmaster, not only to discuss philosophical problems but to persuade him to return to academic life. Thus, it is not at all difficult to conceive that the two men might have exchanged some of their philosophical ideas. We have seen that Wittgenstein's use of the term 'phenomenology' and related ideas revolves around the problem of immediate experience and the language that describes it. Also we have examined his use of the term 'primary language' and 'secondary language' and some possible influences from other thinkers. But in order to clarify Wittgenstein's phenomenology to a greater degree, further investigation is needed as to where Wittgenstein obtained the word 'phenomenology' .
For a clearer picture of Wittgenstein's phenomenology, a consideration of the earlier use of the word 'phenomenology' will be useful. According to Herbert Spiegelberg, the term 'phenomenology' has a rather long history inside and outside the circle of philosophers. 18 On the one hand, Spiegelberg enumerates some ten philosophers who, largely independent of each other, made significant use of the word 'phenomenology', including Kant, Hegel, and Peirce. On the other hand, he lists non-philosophical users of the term, including some surprising names from the field of theoretical physics. What interests us here is the widespread use of the term 'phenomenology' in physical science since the late nineteenth century. Spiegelberg, after mentioning several physicists who used the term, namely, Ernst Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Henry Margenau, concludes as follows:
All these uses are of course related to the merely descriptive, as opposed to the explanatory, conception of physics in G.R. Kirchhoff's school of theoretical physics, for which mechanics was nothing but the attempt to describe the motions occurring in nature as completely and simply as possible without explaining them. Phenomenology in this sense is part and parcel of positivism. 19 What Spiegelberg says here may very well be right, indeed, except that those physicists he mentions can scarcely be said to have all been positivists in any strong sense of the word. But the fact that there was a standard use of the term 'phenomenology' deserves a closer look with a view to figuring out how the use of the term among physicists might or might not be related to what we generally call phenomenology in philosophy today.
Mach was an especially important representative of the phenomenological approach to physics. As an opponent of atomism in his time, who intended to remove all metaphysical elements in consideration of physics, Mach wanted to establish a universal physical phenomenology that would embrace all domains of physics and facilitate a direct description of as broad a field of physical facts as is possible. 20 Mach believed that our senses are the only source of the immediate revelation of scientific facts and that the world should be described by means of the reduction to sensory experiences without employing any artificial hypotheses. When this approach is applied to the theory of heat, it becomes phenomenological thermodynamics, which operates only with directly observable and thus measurable quantities like pressure, volume, temperature, etc. This method is in sharp contrast to an approach to thermodynamics that goes beyond our sensory experience and employs hypotheses. In statistical thermodynamics, these hypotheses postulate unobservable atoms to explain the phenomena of heat as being statistical properties of large numbers of moving atoms. For Mach, this kind of atomistic approach was not acceptable.
Meanwhile, even though he himself was a proponent of atomistic world-view, Boltzmann discussed sympathetically but critically the phenomenological approach to physics. Boltzmann uses the term in such a way that phenomenology in his sense is only concerned with our experience without any hypotheses in dealing with phenomena. For example:
[P]hysics must henceforth pursue the sole aim of writing down for each series of phenomena, without any hypotheses, model or mechanical explanation, equations from which the course of the phenomena can be quantitatively determined. 21 Boltzmann calls this the most extreme form of phenomenology and proposes that this method be mathematical phenomenology because it mainly utilizes differential equations in representing facts. But he also mentions another method called general phenomenology and, not surprisingly, ascribes it to Mach. This latter view [general phenomenology] is characterized by Mach's dictum that electricity is nothing but the sum of all experience that we have had in this field and still hope to have. Both views [mathematical and general phenomenology] set themselves the task of representing phenomena without going beyond experience. 22 Another great physicist, Max Planck, also uses the term 'phenomenology', although in a somewhat different way than Mach or Boltzmann. Planck was once engaged in a polemic with Mach regarding the latter's epistemology. As another proponent of atomism, Planck did not agree with Mach's thesis that the elimination
